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SOVEREIGN AND QUASI.SOVEREIGN !NSOTVENCY:
FEATURES AND RESOLUTION OPTIONS
fiscol indicotors for Nigerio through

rotio-bosed onolysis in on
ottempt to discern the existence

o

or otherwise of build-up of liquidity

quosi-sovereign finonciol crisis
seems to precede fiscol crises. The

Findings indicoted thot though the
incidence of o debt distress wos

post-2007 globol crisis brought o
wove of fiscol crisis thot led some
economies to drosticollytrim down
economic octivities either through
o reduction in services or increose
in toxes to stoy ofloot. lcelond,
Spoin, Greece ond Portugol ore
just o few. Between 2010 ond
October 2013, thirty-eight (38)
municipolities in the United Stotes
filed for bonkruptcy. The United
Stotes government portiolly shutdown on September 30, 2013
owing to the inobility of the
Democrotic ond Republicon
Porties to reoch on ogreement on
the budget, ond debt ceiling
further re-emphosizes the politicol
twist to debt issues. Till dote, the

ond/or insolvency feotures.

low, there were indicotions of

short-run liquidity concerns.
JEL Code: G33, H63, H70,H74

PHEBIAN N. BEWAJI
Reseorch Deportment
CentrolBonk of Nigerio

"The Fundomentol diff erence
befween o Sovereign Stote ond o

Firm is the public interest in
mointoining the Sovereign os o
going, ..... concern" Eichengreen
ond Portes (l 995).
ABSTRACT

Governments, like businesses, ore
sometimes foced with finonciol
constroints, which impede it to
corry out its functions. Thus, stotes,

like households ond firms,
sometimes need to borrow to
inonce its octivities. Unlike
government revenue,
f

expenditures ore counter-cyclicol
ond debts incurred hove to be
repoid of some future dote, bosed
on o repoyment schedule ond

pre-determined terms. ln the
event of o debt crisis, defoult or

liquidity situotion, unlike

households ond componies, the
effects ore more pronounced for
sovereign stotes moinly for two
reosons. Firstly. sovereigns ore
more visible in the globol world.
Secondly. fluid finonciol morkets

hove ensured thot

news,
especiolly bod news spreod like
wild fire. This poper exomines the

these incidences become o more
common phenomenon, throwing
up o hypothesis thot sovereign or

Keywords: llliquid, Bonkruptcy,
Conditionol Solvency, Sovereign,
Quosi-Sovereign, Fiscol Stress.
Resolution Mechonisms

I.O

INTRODUCTION

ln July I B, 2013, the world woke up

to the

news thot the Stote of
Detroit, the lorgest municipolity in
the United Stotes of Americo wos

bonkrupt. The reoction wos

diverse. For some morket onolysts,
it wos not much of o shock. Some

could not be soid for creditors,
bond holders, stote workers ond
pensioners os they become
concerned obout their finonciol
receivobles.

Sovereign

underlying issue remoins
unresolved with stop-gop

meosures being implemented to
ensure continuity of government.

Some onolysts hove orgued

ond

quosi-sovereign
insolvencies ore not entirely new in
the globol londscope. The globol
economy hos witnessed such in
the post, mostly emonoting from
the developed ond emerging
morket economies. Germony

become bonkrupt soon ofter
World Wor ll. Britoin wos oble to
wode off o totol collopse through
o US$4.34 billion loon secured from
the United Stotes in 1945 ond
mode its finol loon repoyment of
US$84 million in 2006. From the lote
I 990s to eorly 2000s. mony stotes in
lndio possed through fiscol stress
chorocterized by ropid increose in

fiscol deficits, debt

ond
contingent liobilities, Liu ond

events thot trigger sovereign

Woibel(2008).

insolvency ond likely meosures of
resolutions. lt ocknowledges the
obsence of o one-size-f its-oll
opprooch to fiscol distress
resolution. lt olso exomines some

Argentino felt its wove of
bonkruptcy in 1999 ond loter

foced on economic collopse in
200,l. However, since the 2007-8
globol finonciol crisis. most of
17

emphoticolly thot the US economy
connot offord o shutdown in the
medium to long-term since it holds
the reserve currency of the world.
Thot view hos become increosingly
debotoble in the modern doy. This,
however, is not the focus of this
poper. The moin messoge here is
thot the post-2007 globol finonciol

crisis hos shown thot ony

government con be foced with
issues of fiscol sustoinobility. The
question is when? Most times, this
question is better imogined thon
reol.

ln Nigerio, outhors such os ldigbe
(2009) hove decried the growing
sovereign/quosi-sovereign fiscol

risks, limited sovereign debt
monogement choices ond
outdoted insolvency lows. This
poper, therefore, seeks to exomine

some trigger foctors thot offect

government liquidity ond
solvency. lt further x-roys resolution
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options. While this poper does not
ottempt to single out o stondord
model for resolution mechonism or
generolize the build-up feotures, it
does ottempt to throw up some
issues ond provide insights from the
experiences of other countries.
The poper is structured in seven (7)
ports. This introduction forms the
first port of the poper. ln section 2.

relotionship is redefined either
through o declorotion of sovereign

some conceptuol issues ore

different debt distress situotions oid
in the identificotion of oppropriote
distress resolution mechonisms.
According to Bolcerowicz (2010),
on importont element in the

discussed. ln section 3, o crossselection of country experiences
ore highlighted. Section 4 presents
o synopsis of fiscol structure in
Nigerio, while section 5 conducts
on ossessment of debt profile for
Nigerio. Section 6 summorizes the

debote oround sovereign debt
resolution mechonism ond section
Z

concludes this poper.

2.0

Concepluol lssues in Debl
Distress Siluolions

bonkruptcy, insolvency or
liquidotion. ln the cose of

corporotes, o decision hos to be
mode to determine if the firm is
worth more when restructured or
liquidoted. However, stotes unlike
firms connot be liquidoted. The

obility to distinguish omong

identificotion of the debt distress
situotion is the inherent obility to
differentiote between illiquidity
ond insolvency. An illiquid situotion
emphosizes the copobility of the
debtor to service ond repoy its

debt occording to

Pre-

determined schedule, but such o

debtor is foced with

short-run

cose of Detroit), o bonkruptcy
filing is mode ond the judiciol
courts hove to decide if
insolvency hos been triggered
ond if so, guide the restructuring
process. This meons therefore, thot
bonkruptcy filings con be
dismissed in low courts. This con
be especiolly true for entities thot
opt to file for bonkruptcy only to
evode repoyment of its debt.
While the judiciol opprooch moy
possess the competence to
"dischorge" the debt ond possibly

mitigote the politicol

pressures

ossocioted with insolvency,

it is

limited in its obility to influence the

fiscol odjustments of quosisovereigns. ln the cose of on
odministrotive procedure, o
higher tier of government con

in the crisis entitY
through on ossumption of
responsibility for the finonciol
intervene

ln recent times, investors ore difficulties. Being illiquid is, thus. o monogement of the entity or the
skewed lorgely towords short-run situotion. lnsolvencY introduction of stote fiscol
government bonds os the bond however, connotes thot the odjustments until the fiscol
morket hos increosinglY debtor is incopoble of servicing or situotion is under relotive control.
complemented ond in some repoying its debt. ln the cose of on This opprooch moy, however, be
coses reploced the troditionol
bonk finonce. Stotes, just like
individuols ond firms, borrow to
meet its obligotions ond these
funds sourced locolly or from
obrood hove to be repoid upon o
pre-ogreed moturity schedule.
Therefore. the creditor identity of

on economic ogent, in this cose o
sovereign or quosi-sovereign,
moy be privote or public, foreign
or domestic ond con lie onywhere
within o two- by-two motrix;

Privotedomestic
Privoteexternol

Publicdomestic
Publicexternol

illiquid entity, some form of shortrun liquidity ossistonce is needed,
whereos on insolvent entity often
requires more by woy of o debt
restructuring or debt reduction or

seen os introducing the morol
hozord problem, Liu ond Woibel
(201

0) ond Schworz (201

Mickesell (2002)

ond Liu

1) .

ond
Woibel (2010) noted the obsence

some other resolution of o single stondord for
mechonisms. Sometimes, the

estoblishing bonkruptcy ond

terms insolvency ond bonkruPtcY

stressed thotwhere they exist, they

ore used interchongeobly. The
key issue is when should the

differ from country to country ond
sometimes ore of o hybrid form.

insolvency concept be triggered?
ln South Africo, there ore sets of
triggers thot flog off "serious
finonciol problems" ond o
different set for "persistent moteriol

breoch of

f inonciol

ln the United
it is simply the
Hungory,
Stotes ond
poy,
(Liu
ond Woibel
to
inobility
2010). Nevertheless, the concePt
of bonkruptcy or insolvency is o
commitments".

ln other words, these cotegories stotus ossocioted with on
when combined together economic entity thot is unoble or
constitute the creditors of ony hos foiled to meet its debt
sovereign stote. Cleorly, this obligotions. lt con be voluntory
combinotion introduces o set of (creditor-initioted) or involuntory
complexities with regords to (debtor-initioted). This stotus con
enforcement of cloims ogoinst the either be imposed through o
debtor-stote. Therefore, in the judiciol odjudicotion or on
event thot these funds connot be odministrotive procedure. ln o
repoid, the debtor-creditor judiciol opprooch (just like in the
r8

ln corporote bonkruptcy,
significont resources ore
chonneled towords determining lf

the deterioroting compony is
worth more liquidoted or

bonkrupt. lndeed. for'free morket'
theorists. they seek to oscertoin if
there is on economic sense in
ollowing the "deterioroting" firms
survive. To such theorists, o firm
thot hos o good business model,
but burdened with debt should be
ollowed to survive, while o firm
with on unsound business model
ond huge debt burden should be
ollowed to liquidote itself ond its

ossets put to better use. This,
however, is not the cose for
sovereigns. Sovereigns con, ot
best. contend with o conditionol
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insolvency. Thot is. o sovereign
foced with o long-term inobility to
repoy or service its debt could be
considered solvent on the
condition thot it emborks on some

ond eoch sovereign

exposed to

bonkruptcy issues. A summory of

trigger f octors in selected
countries: Argentino, Greece, ond
Cyprus ore considered.

odjustment or structurol reforms in
order to regoin the confidence of
ond re-enter the internotionol
copitol morkets. From o purely
economic point of view, therefore,

Argenlino

The Argentine economy

of hyperinflotion peoking ot 5.000 per cent
in 1989, which eroded the volue of
the domestic currency (Argentine
experienced bouts

o

sovereign is to reorgonize itself os
they connot be liquidoted ond ot
best, the insolvency issue is on

Peso)

empty concept. Bolcerowicz

ond led to

increosed

domestic demond for poyments in

US dollor.

(2010), Liu ond Woibel (2010). ln
other words, if occepted os given,
o sovereign or quosi-sovereign
bonkruptcy con of best trigger the
restructuring of Stote debt, which is
seen os o tool to redress the Stotes'
finonciol imbolonces. The question
therefore is how o stote con best
reorgonize its finonciol situotion.
Prior to deciphering the literoture
on such mechonisms, on overyiew
of some events thot potentiolly
leod sovereigns ond their quosi
counterports to the poth of o fiscol
stress is discussed.

ln

1991,

the

locol
currency wos fixed to the US dollor

ond wos freely convertible

domesticolly. To preserve the
volue of the notionol currency,
there wos o reversion to the
Argentine Peso ond convertibility

low yielded positive

results.
However, the fixed exchonge rote
meont thot imports were cheoper;

unemployment rose, ond
government expenditure ond
borrowing levels remoined high,
leoding to unsustoinoble debt
profile become unsustoinoble with

obility to service their debt

3.0 Poth to Bonkruptcy:
Selected Counlry

groduolly weokening . By 1999,
the Argentine economy wos in

Experiences
A declorotion of sovereign/quosi-

recession. Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) wos ot 4.0 per cent, deficitGDP rotio wos 2.5 per cent ond
externol debt wos obove 50.0 per

sovereign bonkruptcy never

hoppens precipitously.

is

o set of differing foctors, which
triggers country-specific

form of mocroeconomic

the only ovoiloble option for
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A

cent of GDP. The Argentine

combinotion of foctors often
precedes these circumstonces

economy emborked on ousterity

meosures on the odvice

of

(lMF), which

included expenditure-

lreeze; cuts in sociol ond
retirement benefits; solory cuts;
issuonces of lOUs to highly poid
government employees ond rising

bond yields. At this time,

continuous borrowing from the IMF
seemed to be the only vioble

option, but the Argentine

government wos unoble to meet
up with the loon conditionolity,
which subsequently meont thot
the IMF could not extend further

loons to the Argentine

government. Bond yields soored
higher reoching 42.0 per cent in
December 20Ol . This occentuoted
the crisis os economic confidence
become weok. A bonk-run wos
triggered os people withdrew

huge omounts of money,

converted them to dollors to stosh
owoy obrood until the Argentine
government ploced o one-yeor
freeze (locolly known os corrolito)
on oll bonk occounts ond loter
limited withdrowols to $250 per
week. By 2001, the government
onnounced o defoult to o tune of

$85 billion, which further

froze

copitol flow. At end-July 2014, the

Argentine economy hod
defoulted eight times in its history.
The Argentine economy
continued to be oced with
f

depleting foreign reserves,

currency devoluotion ond growing
sociol upheovols.

Something of a reputation
Sovereign defautts, top ten countries (no. ofdefaults)

1820 40

60

80

1900 20

40

60

80

Argentina (a)
Ecuador (to)
Venezuela (ro)
Uruguay (e)
Costa Rica

1e,)

Peru/a)

Branl(s)

tO*

Chite (s)
Mexico (s)
Turkey 14,1
Sources: Carmen Reinhartand Kenneth Rogoff; Moody's

Source: Ihe Economist (2014)

l9

the

lnternotionol Monetory Fund,

2000 74
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debt

triggered
lorgely by the globol economic
recession in 2008. Prior to this
period were o series of underlying
circumstonces. Between 2000 ond

The Greek

crisis wos

2007, the Greek economy

witnessed on onnuol growth rote
of 4.2 per cent in the foce of huge
foreign copitol inflow. However,
during this period, the Greek

government continued to

mointoin high levels of

government debt ond structurol
deficits. High public expenditure
chonneled to public sector
woges, non-growth stimuloting
sector (militory ond defense
spending), coupled with structurol
deficiencies ond low tox receipts
(moinly due to tox evosion)

exocerboted the government's

finonciol position, with debt-GDP
rotio obove 90.0 percent between
2000-2007, o situotion considered
unsustoinoble os itwos higherthon
the 60.0 per cent globol threshold.
ln o BBC report. it wos recorded
thot Greece wos "living beyond its
meons even before it joined the
Euro-Zone". On joining the Euro in
2001. ottempts to meet the eurozone borrowing cop of 3.0 per
cent of Gross Domestic Product
further put pressure on the Greek
government os they mosked the

true level of debt

obligotions.
Credits from other sources were

conceoled os finonciol product
swops ond cross currency swops.
There wos olso o prevolence of
stotisticol misreporting. By 2008,
when the globol economic crisis
occurred, the Greek economy
become hord hit. ln 2010, o newly
elected government revised the
government debt figures for post
yeors. For instonce, government
debt, which wos eorlier estimoted

of on overoge of 7.0 per cent of
GDP, wos revised severolly to 1 30.0
per cent of GDP for fiscol 2009.
lnvestors were foced with o crisis of

confidence which sow two-yeor
government bond yields rising
from 4.5 per cent in 2003 to obove
per cent in 2012.This froze the
privote finonciol morket funding to
IOO

the Greek government. ln

government debt

2010,

wos

'l

APRIL

downgroded to junk bond stotus.
With privote copitol morket
funding olmost impossible. the
lnternotionol Monetory Fund ond
Euro-zone members hod to
perform o lender-of-lost-resort
function dependent upon the
obility of the Greek government to
meet certoin conditionolities such
os implementotion of ousterity

meosures, privotizotion of

government ossets, reduction in
the foce volue of Greek bonds
held by creditors' to the tune of
53.5 per cent, ond structurol
reforms. The Greek government
hos been o recipient of severol
boil-out pockoges ond is currently
undergoing structurol reforms os
well os fiscol consolidotion to steer
its economy bock on the poth of
sustoinoble growth.
Cyprus
The Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

of Cyprus is estimoted ot US$25
billion with the bonking sector
occounting forobout 700 percent
of its GDP ond obout 33 percent of
bonking sector funds lorgely
sourced from offshore economies
(Gongloff , 201 3). ln 2009, following
the US sub-prime mortgoge crisis,

the Cypriot economy
experienced o recession

chorocterized by weok economic
growth, high unemployment, ond
rising non-performing loons. Soon
ofter the Greek debt crisis
emerged, Cyprus wos engulfed in
o finonciolcrisis of its own brought
on lorgely by rising public debt
ond further exocerboted by
bonking crisis with huge domestic
bonk exposures to Greek bonds,
downgrode of Cypriot bond credit
roting ond the lock of politicolwill
of the Cypriot government to
restructure the notion's finonciol
sector. Consequently, the Cypriot
government wos foced with high
yields on long term bonds ond
inobility to occess internotionol
morkets. By 2012, Cyprus sought for
o boil out from the Europeon Union
(EU). However, there wos opothy
from the EU to boil out onother
member notion ofter hoving just
boiled out Greece. Thus, os port of
the initiol boil out proposots, the
20

20I3 - MARCH 2OI4

n policy mo kers
proposed thot obout "5 billion
euros of the roughly l6 billion euro,
or $21 billion boilout pockoge"
would be poid by Cypriot bonk
depositors ond o one-off toxof 6.7
per cent ond 9.9 per cent on bonk
deposits of €100,000 ond obove
wos suggested os o meosure to
Europeo

poy bock Cypriot debt.

This

meosure wos loter stolled moinly
for three reosons: (i) Government
is 'trusted' to insure ond protect
sovers' deposits. not to obrogote
on thot promise ond hence could
not be perceived os setting o
dongerous precedent; (ii) the
imminent threot of tox on deposits
meont thot bonk bond holders
become wory thot they could be
the next torget; ond (iii) There wos
olso concern of imminent bonk
run by occount holders not only in
Cyprus, but in other Europeon
countries in o bid to ovoid similor
fote befolling them. Even though

the one-off levies were

not
implemented. there were sociol
demonstrotions ond Europeon
bonk stock prices begon to dip,
reflecting the sensitivity of morkets
to the proposol. Eventuolly, the
Cypriot government, in
conjunction with the Troiko
(Europeon Union, lnternotionol
Monetory Fund ond Europeon
Centrol Bonk) finolly ogreed to

implement structurol reforms,
recopitolize the finonciol sector,
close some of the most troubled

bonks, embork on fiscol
consolidotion os well os
implement onti-money
loundering initiotives in exchonge
for o €lObillion boil-out pockoge
to be disbursed in regulortronches
till Morch 2016. The boilout
pockoge comprised of €4.lbn

(debt refinoncing ond

omortizotion). €2.5bn (bonk
recopitolizotion) ond €3.4bn
(fiscol deficits). These omounts
ore expected to be poid to
Cyprus through regulor tronches
from l3 Moy,20l3 until 3l Morch,
2016.
The foregoing indicotes thot fiscol

crises ore often preceded by o
build-up of circumstonces with

APRIL 2OI3 - MARCH 2OI4
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I

tortuous side effects. A visible sign,
ond most often the first phose of o
liquidity or debt crisis is copitol
flight-to-quolity. This could be from
the locol currency to onother
currency, from one finonciol osset
to onother osset. For instonce, if
the crisis is observed in the privote
sector. investors could ponic by
selling off their ossets ond increose

sub-notionol level os the tederol

demond for government

ossets.

Bonking sector crisis,

mismonogement of fiscol policies,
persistent increose in budgetory

deficits,

corruption,

mocroeconomic ond externol

shocks ore some key triggers of o

sovereign-quosi-sovereign fiscol

crisis. While eoch country

government does not hove
complete oversight funclion over
the fiscol offoirs of the stotes. Ihis
lock of oversight hos often times
promoted the indiscriminote ond
discretionory use of government
funds. As Ushie 2010 puts it,
"Comrption ond mismonogement
of public fi nonces ore problemotic
of oll levels of government in
Nigerio', with "the mojor driver of
comrption being the discretionory
use of funds by the Executive (i.e.
Governors ond Locol Government
Choirmen), ond the lock of
tronsporency ond occountobility
in the utilizotion of expenditures ot
the sub-notionol level'.

contends with its specific triggers,
resolution options olso differ,

Thot Nigerio's mojor source of

historicol ontecedents, Reinhort
ond Rogoft, (2009), ond Liu ond

revenue is derived from oil, which
constitutes over 70 per cent of
totol revenue, is stoting the
obvious. According to o 2013

depending on the notion's
politicol, economic, legol ond

Woibel(2010).

4.0 A Synopsis of Nigerio's
FiscolStruclure
Nigerio is o Federol Republic with
three tiers of government- Federol.
Stote ond Locol. As o fiscol

federolism, the finonciol

report by the US Energy
lnformotion Administrotion,

Nigerio is considered the second
highest crude oil producer in
Africo with on estimoted proven
crude oil reserve of 37.2 billion

monogement

of

Nigerio's oil

resources hos been shrouded with

sovereigns os well os the ensuing
obligotions ond responsibilities of
eoch tier is guided by the 1999

emphosizes the politicol, os wellos

the Executive, Legislotive ond
Judiciol orm of government. As
tiers of government. ollocotions

Account Allocotion Committee

much controversy thot lorgely

the economic ond inonciol
ospects. Some of which hove
constitution which cleorly resulted to the Moy 14, 2010
delineotes the powers between imposse of the Federotion
ore obtoined from o generol pool
of revenue which is shored
occording to o pre-determined
ond ogreed formulo os indicoted
in the Fiscol Responsibility Act,

(FRA). Notwithstonding the

dictotes of the Fiscol Responsibility
Act, there is o consideroble
degree of fiscol outonomy of the

compored with obout US$11.5
billion in December 2012. Srch
circumstonces portend huge
chollenges for pubfrc finonckrlond

debt monogement. Witfi

govemment expeMitures lagety
dependent on the monthty FAAC
dislribulion, stotes moy deloy the
execution of new proiects or holt
the continuotion of ongoing
proiects. This sifuolion becomes
worse for stoles whose intemoty

generoted revenue (lGRl

is

relolively low. Cunent eslimoted
needs of thefederoling unitsstond
ot N50Obillion monlhly, but monthty

poyouh hove often follen below
thiseslimote.

Notwithstonding these

developmenh, concerted fscol
reform meosures hove been
introduced by the government ot
the notionollevelto improve fscol
responsibility. Ihese include the
odoption of the oil-pdce bqsed

fiscol rule, medium term
borrels. Regrettobly, the expenditure fromework, the

relotionship' between the federol

government ond its quosi-

conlinued deptalion of the Excess
Crude Account (ECAI whose
bolonce stood ot less thon US$25
billion on Jonuory lV, 2Ol4

f

(FAAC) meeting', during which
then Minister of Stote for Finonce
stoted thot the growth of
discretionory spending hod
outpoced the economic growth
rote over the post 10 yeors with
lorge deficits. ln oddition, in its

Monetory Policy Committee
meeting of Jonuory 20-21, 2014,
the Centrol Bonk of Nigerio
expressed concern over the

possoge of the Fiscol Responsibility
Act, Treosury Single Account [RA]
ond institutionolizotion of the
Sovereign Weolth Fund (SWF). Of
porticulor reference here is the
Sovereign Weolth Fund, which wos
estoblished to conserve o
percentoge of fundsfrom crude oil
in excess of whot is opproprioted
by the Notionol Assembly. Hitherto.
such funds were domiciled in the
Excess Crude Account (ECA)

creoted by the

Olusegun

Oboso njo odministrotion ond were

discretionorily used by the Federol

Government even when the

Constitution required it to be poid
into the Federotion Account ond
shored to the three tiers of
government. There wos o brood
consensus thot the incessont

'Thisfinonciolrelolionship entoilsroles ondinteractionswithregordtobonowing, spendin g,revenue generotion, os wellospublrc debl
'IheFederoling unitsof Nigerioundertheumbrelloof the Federotion Account Allocotion Commitlee (FAAC) melonFridoy, Moy tl,20l0,to
distribute fhe proceeds of the Excess Crude Oiloccounl {ECA).The meeting, however, endedwith no funds dislributedforthe firsf fimesince
the Federotion Accounis Allocotion Commitlee meeting wos introduced. Ihe FAAC meeting ended inconclusively with the rneeting
suspended lill lhe Minister of Finonce mel wilh ihe President to chort o woy forword os ECA deduclions for poymenl is subject lo the

\ opprovol of lhe President.
21

Volume 32, No. 2 - Volume 38, No.

I

drowdown from the ECA in the
form of budget ougmentotion
wos unheolthy for the system,

this study for the simple reoson

more so, with the inter-

generotionol concerns often

overlooked. While the concept of

the ECA countered the counter
cyclicol noture of revenue in time,
its mode d'emploiwos o source of
concern os it locked o legol
foundotion. This situotion led to the
institutionolizotion of o Sovereign
Weolth Fund in October 2011 to
signol o new fiscol relotionship

omong the three tiers of
government. The SWF comprises
of o stobilizotion fund, on
infrostructure fund ond on inter-

generotionol soving fund.
However, documentotions

indicote thot the "legislotion is
silent on the mechonism for

determining how much oil

ollocoted to the SWF, os
the benchmork budget oil price
remoins subject to negotiotion
between the executive ond
legislotive bronches", (lMF 2012).
On Moy 27, 2O14, President
Jonothon signed the Nigerio
Sovereign lnvestment Authority
(NSIA) bill into low with $1 billion
seed copitol for the fund ond the
expectotion thot it will be funded
revenue

is

monthly with excesses of
budgetory revenue from oil.

APRIL 2013 - MARCH

non-rebosed GDP wos odopted in

the rebosed doto set

thot
wos

unovoiloble pre-2010. However, it
wos observed thot the use of the
rebosed GDP in the onolysis did
not indicote much vorionce from
the non-rebosed GDP ond thus
not presented here.

Debl Profile of Federol ond Slote
Governmenls
We exomine domestic debt stock
of the Federol Government ond
the externol debt stock of both the
Federolond Stote Governments in
percent of GDP. lt is observed thot
from 1990 to 2006, externol debt
stock outpoced domestic debt in
per cent of GDP. The highest peok
of externol debt stock wos
recorded in l99l oI 63.2 per cent

ond thereofter the

economy
witnessed o groduol reduction in
its externol debt stock until l99B
when there wos on upturn, which
peoked of obout 53 per cent in
1999. With the debt relief secured
by Nigerio from its Poris Club
creditors in2OO4, coupled with the
ex-onte effects of the 2007 globol
finonciol crisis, which lorgely froze
the credit morkets, Nigerio's
externol debt stock in percent of
GDP declined ond hos overoged
2.5 per cent of GDP. lt is pertinent

20I4

to mention thot the 2007 Fiscol
Responsibility Act prescribed o
debt ceiling of 25 per cent of GDP.
Anolysis on domestic debt stock is
restricted to federol government
ond locol government for those
yeors where doto is ovoilobleo.
Federol government domestic
debt stock in per cent of GDP
peoked its highest in 1994 ot 29.1
percent. Subsequently, there hos

been o decline with few
oscillotions during the yeors.

However, there hos been on
observed upword trend in federol
government domestic debt stock
since 2008. For most of the somple
period, the correlotion between
domestic ond externol debt stock
wos positive, until 2007 when the
relotionship reversed following the

globol f inonciol crisis. Locol

government debt stock in percent
of GDP hos remoined lorgely
contoined with o peok of 0.3 per
cent of GDP for the yeors where
doto is ovoiloble.

ottempt to onolyze the debt
levels of sovereign ond quosisovereigns, exomining only the
debtGDP rotio is insufficient for
ln on

the simple reoson thot

this
meosure does not occount for the
obility of government, especiolly
the quosi-sovereigns, to roise its

5.0

Assessment of the Fiscol
Profile in Nigerio
Descriptive evidence obout the
evolution of quosi-sovereign ond

Flgure

onnuol doto f rom stotutory
ogencies. Thus, doto on debt is

sourced from the Debt
Monogement Office, while Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) ond
government finonce stotistics ore
derived from the stotisticol bulletin
of the Centrol Bonk of Nigerio. The

Debt profile of Federolond Slole Government
o.3

70.o

sovereign debt bosed on

ovoiloble doto is presented in this
section. The scope of study is 19902013. However, the stort point is
osymmetric forthe doto set due to
the unovoilobility of published
debt doto ocross government
tiers. This study relies on published
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o

lt is difficult to oscertoin the indebtedness of sub-notionol governments in Nigerio for the period of study, except for the yeors
when doto
wos publicly ovoiloble on the website of the Debt Monogement Office.
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Figure 2: Expenditure in Percent of Gross Domestic Product

ol

(20.l 3). Consequently, other
indicotors thot took into

considerotion governmenf's

25.0

revenue-generoting ond

4

o

spending potterns were olso

I

20.0

o

exomined.

=
o 1"5.0

o

e 10.0

The expenditure pottern of the
federol government ond quosi-

E

5.0

sovereigns in Nigerio hos shown o
lorgely positive upword trend. A

0.0

huge rise in sub-notionol

expenditures since 1996, olmost ot
por with expenditures of the
federollevel is olso observed. This is
on indicotion of the growth in the
size of sub-notionol government in
Nigerio. However, this size should
not be construed os on indicotor
of government efficiency. Stotes
often orgue for more funds to
embork on or complete existing
projects. However, the socioeconomic returns of these funds

ore often questioned by

the
populoce. Tensions continue to
exist even between the stote ond
locol governments rooted moinly
in the inefficient tronsmission of
funds to the locol government.
Generol government expenditure
hos peoked of 26.8 percent of
GDP in Ihe24yeor somple period.

Mointoining fiscol stobility ond
debt sustoinobility hos remoined o

growing chollenge in the
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hove often times exceeded fiscol

However, domestic debt of the
federol government hos lorgely

deterioroting fiscol bolonce for
most stotes. This roises o number of
implicotions thot worront coreful
scrutiny ond considerotion. The
plot in figure 3 indicotes thot the
government hod occumuloted
more externol debt in excess of its
revenue generoting octivities. ln
the period 1990-2005, more thon
holf of government's revenue wos
chonneled towords meeting
debt-reloted obligotions. ln most
coses, the federol government's
externol debt obligotions overshot
its revenue-generoting copocities.
There wos o dromotic reversol of
trend from 2006 just o yeor prior to

0.0

ON<f(oOONsf(ooOON
o)OIOIOTo)OOOOOT<Fl
ororooloooooooo
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the globol finonciol crisis ofter
which externol debt to revenue

o

Subnational Expenditure ln Percent of GDP

Source: Authors' computotion

development process of most
quosi-sovereigns in Nigerio.
Growing development needs

revenues, resulting in

!

rotios hove remoined of low levels.

exceeded its proceeds

throughout the somple period with
the exception of the yeors 20052008. During the somple period, its
highest peok wos in 1994, when

the federol government

government domestic debt levels.
Moreover, o ropid occumulotion
of debt is signol of underlying ond
persistent budget deficits. Locol

government domestic debt-

revenue rotio ottoined its lowest
ond highest peok of 0.3 percent
ond 4.7 per cent in 2008 ond 2009,
respectively.
One mojor element of government

occumuloted domestic debt to
the tune of 4.5 times its revenue,

finonces is the interest rote ot
which borrowing is finonced.

while its lowest recorded pointwos
in 20OB when domestic debt levels
of federol government in percent
of retoined revenue stood of 73
percent. This occumulotion of
debt beyond revenue generoting

Theoreticolly, if interest rotes grow
of o rote higherthon the economic
growth, o short-run liquidity crisis is
imminent ond the potentiol of
long-run insolvency is high. lt is
therefore, in this regord thot this
study further exomines this doto
set. Consequently. the treosury bills
rote is used to proxy the interest

obilities emphosize

the

riskiness

ond further questions the
sustoinobility of the ederol
f

ct^Lrl?At
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Y
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rote otwhich government borrows
short-term, while the yield on tenyeor bond is used to proxy longterm government borrowing', ond
gross domestic product (in
nominol terms) is used to proxy the
economic growth.

Figure

4

overshoot

shows

of

45
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sustoined
interest rotes on
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25
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government securities hove been
somewhot volotile. lnterest rotes
for most of the period hove
outstripped the income levels of
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debt levels ore lorgely contoined,
domestic debt levels ore growing

beyond income ond revenue-

generoting copocities of
government. ln oddition, the rote
of which government finonces
itself, ot leost in domestic terms,
moy not be sustoinoble in the
long-term in view of its income
eornings. This is on indicotion thot o

sustoined shock

to

current

sustoinobility.

spoce. lt shows thot while externol

A "one-size" fits oll opprooch to

'lt is ossumed thot the volume of securilies sold
rote movements.

is

revenue generoting copocities
could negote ony ottempt ot
promoting fiscol ond debt

6.0

Resolulion of FiscolDistress

rie

r&.

ra

DayT-gill Rate

rGrossFederallycollectiblerevenue(RHS)

government. lt is observed thot this
hos been quite persistent since
lote 2011 further questioning the
sustoinobility of fiscol policy. The
foregoing is on ottempt to present

some stylized focts with the
ovoiloble doto in the public

10

2.m

Keynesions theoreticol
underpinnings of on inverse

The growth rotes of government

r

4.OO

greoterthon 7 percent hove been
responsible for triggering boil-outs
for Portugol, Greece ond lrelond.
The growth in rotes in excess of
nominol income conforms to the

collectible revenue.

20

6.OO

trends were highlighted in o
Bloomberg orticle, which cleorly
observed thot l0 yeor yields

(onnuolized) gross f ederolly

I

a.@

government securities in excess of
the growth in nominol income
since 201 l. Yields on government
securities were lower in 2OO9 ond
20,l0 following the globol finonciol
crisis ond the domestic stock
morket crosh. lt hos however been
on on upword trend since then
reoching its peok in the first quorter
of 20 I 2- for higher thon the on-stort
of crisis. The downside of such

:

35

:;l

o

revenue ond interest

40

c 10.oo

relotionship between interest rotes
ond income levels. The Keynesions
orgue thot decline in interest rotes
offects (by reducing) the cost of
copitol, which boosts investment
expenditure ond finolly increoses
income (Mishkin, 1996). To put in
proper perspective, o similor
onolysis is corried out using

20I4

-Yleldonlo-YearBond

resolving

o

bonkruptcy

crisis

hordly exists. ln o 2013 report by
Brookings lnstitution, it is cleorly
orticuloted thot'there is no legolly

or politicolly recognized
procedure for restructuring the
debt of bonkrupt sovereigns'.
However, there ore no cleor cut
procedures to deol with o

sovereign bonkruptcy. Perhops,
the orticle by "The Economist"
cleorly resonotes when they
noted thot "Countries, unlike
componies, connot seek the
protection of o bonkruptcy court.
lmportont feotures of domestic
bonkruptcy low-on importiol
judge, protection from lowsuits,

foirly constont ond thus chonges in interesi expenses con be lorgely ottributed to interest
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the obility to force restructuring

scholors hove olluded thot the
creditor-hold-out problem, where
o creditor holds-out on reoching
on ogreement with the debtor
stote on the ossumption thot they
could still moke o fullcloim on the
omount being owed since other
creditors moy be forced to poy-

terms on recolcitront
creditors-do not exist for
sovereign borrowers" To the
extent, thot stotes do not hove
shoreholders like componies, most
corporote bonkruptcy resolution

options hove little or no
opplicotion on sovereign debt

restructuring for the simple reoson
thot liquidotion is not o feosible
option for o government. ln other
words, the only feosible decision

with regords to sovereigns

is

or o modified
corporote opprooch, rother thon
liquidotion. ln the literoture, some
resolution options hove included:
reorgonizotion

(l)

Debt restrucluring:

up, tends to deloy debt

restructuring deols. A recent
exomple is thot of o hedge fund
creditor to the Argentine
government who instituted legol
proceedings ogoinst the
Argentine government ond hos
persisted in his demond for full
reimbursement on his 2O0l
holdings of Argentine debt
instruments, while olso borring the

This

mechonism con be triggered
when relief finoncing from officiol
sources con no longer be
guoronteed. Debt restructuring is
more or less voluntory in noture

ond hinges on o

APRIL 2013 - MARCH 2OI4

successf ul

negotiotion between the debtor
ond its creditors. Restructuring con
toke ploce ex-onte or ex-post of o
defoult situotion. Often, debt
restructuring con either involve o
debt rescheduling, which could
involve on extension of moturities
or lowering of interest rotes. lt
could olso be in the form of debt
reduction whereby foce volues of
debt instruments ore lowered.
Stotes ore however foced with

Argentine government from
meeting its debt obligotions to
exchonge bond holders thot
ogreed to o restructuring deol in
2005 ond 2010. This hos continued
to erode investor confidence,

locked out the Argentine

borrowing sources hove

economy from internotionol debt
morket for l3 yeors ond continues
to constroin debt servicing. ln
oddition, onolysis hos shown thot
most stotes'debt is held in bonds.
The diversity of bond holders
introduces o complexity in o debt
restructuring plon os bonds ore
copitol morket instruments thot
ore publicly troded in the open
morket, eosily moves from one
investor to onother; thus moking it
difficult to reoch o unonimous
decision. Some issuing houses ond

exponded beyond the troditionol
bonk sources to include bond ond
institutionol investors, leoding to
the collective oction problem. This
requires sovereigns ond quosisovereigns to renegotiote the debt
terms with its creditorsu, ogreeing
on re-poyment schedule, interest
rote, timing of poyments, ond
moturities. However, some

collective oction clouses'in bond
indentures to militote ogoinst such
hold-out problems when debt
instruments ore moinly bond. ln
reolity, this moy not hove been the
proctice. ln the recent Greek debt
crisis, for exomple, 90 percent of
the totol debt wos not governed
by collective oction clouses,

increosingly hord choices

os

underwriters now include

I ). However, the
Greek bond exchonge

Schworcz (20i

progromme in 2012 hos been
occloimed os being very orderly,
moinly due to the foct thot olmost
97 percent of Greek bonds were
governed by locol lows, which
resulted to 97 per cent of creditor
porticipotion ond o further debt
relief of 50 per cent of GDP. The
cose in Cyprus wos different os o
substontiol port of its debt stock

wos governed by foreign lows
which resulted in foreign bond
holders being fully settled ond on

time compored to bonk
depositors.

(l)

Prominent outcomes of

debt restructuring deols often
include swops ond hoir-cuts.

Following the Argentine defoult in
2002, o restructuring deol wos
ogreed where 76 per cent of
defoulting bonds were swopped
for longer doted bonds with
nominolvolues in the ronge of 25 to
35 per cent. ln the 2005 ond 20.l0
Argentine debt restructuring deols,
on estimoted 93 per cent of
creditors hod to occept hoircuts of
70 cents on the dollor. ln Brozil, the
1997 tederol government's debt
ogreements with 25 of its stotes
relied on ex-onte fiscol regulotions
which were imposed on o cose by
cose bosis. The cose of Hungory is

such thot there is o debt
committee responsible for drofting
the restructuring plon ond osset
distribution, which is implemented
on the condition thot o minimum of
50 percent of creditors whose

cloims occount for of leost 33
percent of undisputed cloims. ln
the event thot on ogreement is
unreochoble on who tokes priority

during the osset distribution
process, the low court tokes o finol

decision thot connot be

oSovereigns

con choose lhe closs of debl fhey wish lo reslructure orreschedu/e. ln the cose of supro ond multinotionolorgonzoiions such os
the World Bonk ond lMF, this c/ouse breoks down os omounts owed io lhese inslitutions ore poid inespeclive of the c/oss of creditor being
reschedu/ed., Allen ond Overy {201 I ) .
'fhese ore essentio/ly c/ossified os o modified morkei so/ution to promote orderly resolution withoul the need for bonkruptcy courls. They
hove become increosingly o feoture of sovereign bond conlrocfs. Since Jonuory 2013, newly issued Europeon sovereign bonds hove
begun to incorporole col/eciive oction clouses, Commitlee on lnternoiionol Economic Policy ond Reform (2013). However, mosi bonds

denominoied in locol cunency ore governed by locol lows ond hence lock most proieclive clouses usuolly obtoinoble with bonds
denominoled in f oreign cunency or governed by f oreign low.

25

Volume 37, No. 2 - Volume 38, No.

I

oppeoled, Liu ond Woibel (2010).

thon even the cost of borrowing or

ln some other jurisdictions, priority
cloims ore not guided by ony low,
but ore bosed on consensus ond

the limited supply of

privote

ogreements. Most often. the

outcome of restructuring
ogreements depends on the

funding. Secondly, there is o
prevolence of court rulings ihot
ollows holdout creditors the right

borgoining position of the

to interfere with poyments to other
creditors thot occept o
restructuring deolwith on entity. ln

APRIL 2OI3 - MARCH 2OI4

involved porties.

other words, rulings, which

(i)

encouroge creditor, hold outs ond
discouroge creditor porticipotion

High toxes: As o resolution

tool. odvocotes of higher toxes in

the foce of o liquidity concerns
postulote thot the Stote hos
unlimited powers to eorn revenue

from toxes to minimize its debt
burden. ln theory, this works,
however ond in proctice, there

could be limitotions. McConnel

ond Picker (1993) orgued on the

possibility of o threshold beyond
which tox rote increoses will ceose
to increose tox revenue. When tox
poyers ore foced with increosing
rotes, they lose the incentive to
work to eorn more income (which
will be eventuolly toxed), move to
tox hoven stotes or they devise
woys to minimize theireffective tox
rote. This is known os the "ousterity
fotigue" which further worsens the
economic prospects of the Stote.
ln environments where there is
limited copocity to exploit the tox
bose, this opprooch moy not be
entirely feosible which further
constroins the obility to honor
finonciol commitments. ln other
instonces, there could be fire-soles
of government ossets.

(ii)

Globol sovereign debt

reslructuring mechonism (SDRM):

There hove been concerns
whether Stote debt restructuring
shouid be subject to regulotion by
supronotionol bodies such os the
lnternotionol Monetory Fund. A
decode ogo, this opprooch to
debt restructuring wos rejected os
&untries were less willing to forfeit

in debt exchonge swop

offers

could worsen o notionol
opprooch to debt resolution.

Thirdly. currenf siructure of
regionol orrongements such os
currency union limits the
instruments ovoiloble to deol with
debt crises. Therefore, the globol

opprooch

to

sovereign debt
restructuring hos been proposed
to include the estoblishment of o
sovereign debt odjustment focility
by the lnternotionol Monetory
Fund ond the introduction of o

coordinoted collective oction
clouse thot shields debtors from

the creditor hold out problem ond
more importontly minimize the
morket foilures ossocioted with
bonkruptcy proposols. ln essence,
the SDRM, just like in o corporote
bonkruptcy, is to provide o third
porty orrongement, in this cose
the lMF, which creditors or debtors
moy legolly turn to. Those in fovour
of this mechonism orgue thot this

opprooch to sovereign

bonkruptcy would minimize
creditors' resort to court litigotions
which ore usuolly lengthy, reploce

the Fund's troditionol

conditionolity lending, reduce the
collective oction problems thot
could moteriolize due to the
tronsition from lorgely bonk bosed
debt to bond-bosed sovereign
debt ond olso oddress both
liquidity ond insolvency crisis of
sovereigns.

theii sovereign power to (iii) Nolionol Bonkruptcy
supronotionol rules ond Syslems: The operotionol
institutions. ln recent times, it is
bonkruptcy system should be on
being reconsidered for severol
reosons. Firstly, there is increosed
tendency for excessive borrowing
omong countries which ore now
being perceived os higher risks

odmixture of o system thot fovors
liquidotion, ond onother which
prof f ers o reorgonizotion to

mointoin the going concern
concept. Levitin (2012) orgues
26

thot stote fiscol crises, especiolly in
the United Stotes ore o product of
o fiscol federolism structure, which
connot be reodily fixed by
bonkruptcy plons, which ore

designed os o finonciol

restructuring exercise. He orgued
thot reorgonizotion proposols
could be o tool to offer some
politicol goins to certoin interests
os ioking o decision on the priority
of cloims in bonkruptcy plons is o
politicol decision. He therefore
colls for o politicol restructuring of
the fiscol federolism system, which
would solve the underlying "bod
business model" or "structurol
problem" of quosi-sovereigns.

lonchovichino, Liu, ond

Nogorojon (2007) olso shore
of the constroints

similor views

imposed by the intergovernmentol system, which limits
the obilities of quosi-sovereigns to
fiscolodjustment.

(iv)

Regulotion of sub-nolionol

debt finoncing: These ore

resolution options thot seek to

provide guidonce on debt-

finoncing ond reloted motters. Liu
ond Woibel (2010) stress the need

to regulote sub-notionol
borrowing especiolly in on
uncertoin mocroeconomic

environment in order to streomline
unbridled occess to morkets ond
minimize the chonces of defoult
risk. They further note thot huge

borrowing to finonce

operoting/revenue deficits hove
been lorgely responsible f or

unsustoinoble

debt poths

in

countries such os lndio. Hungory
ond Russio. ln their submission, the
duol combinotion of ex-onte fiscol
rules ond ex-post insolvency

meosures, while mointoining
minimum public ond essentiol
services con minimize the risk of
defoults. ln the cose of Nigerio,
there hove been suggestions to
explore the option of drowing
down on substontiol omount of
government bonk deposits os well
os utilizing the infrostructure fund
to finonce lorge-scole copitol
projects ond other expenditure
insteod of borrowing, IMF (2012).
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(v)

implementotion of reforms; (iv)
mutuol recognition of rights ond

Corporote bonkruptcy
opprooch lo sovereign debt
restrucluring: This opprooch
odvocotes for on 'lnternotionol

for sovereign debt

convention

restructuring" such thot creditors,
notwithstonding their decision to
ogree to o restructuring plon or
chose to hold out, would be
bound by super-mojority vote
where mojor closs of creditors vote

obligotions of sovereigns ond their

creditors; ond (v) o morketoriented negotioting fromework
with less politicizotion of debt
issues. Others such os Schworcs
(201 1) proposes o minimolist

fromework where quosi-

sovereigns design

o

mutuolly

occeptoble debt restructuring

ore notfixed ond con be bosed on
pure morket or modified morket
solutions. Therefore, the design or
choice of o resolution mechonism
must be one thot con odjust the

behovior of stote creditors ond
debtors, while ensuring thot

minimum public socio-economic
needs ore met. One cruciolfoctor
is the obility to truthfully recognize
the imminent signs ond embork on
timely precoutionory meosures to

for o restructuring ond plon with its creditors thot enobles
reorgonizotion plon. lt further both porties to minimize the prevent f uture susloinobility

suggests for the privotizotion of
funding ond o shift from tox-bosed
funding to other lending strotegies.
Miller ond Zhong (2000) odvocote

opplying the US procedure
obtoinoble in the US corporote
bonkruptcy low to sovereigns

borrowers ond further odvocote
the 'freezing' of credito/s cloims
ogoinst debtorsovereigns during o
bonkruptcy proceeding ond to

ollow for o proper debt

restructuring. However, some
others hove orgued ogoinst o
freeze on both the principol ond
interest poyments. The consensus

is

to freeze just the principol, but
permit interest poyments to
continue to be poid to creditors
until such o time when the
bonkruptcy proceedings ore
resolved. Cohen (l9B9o) onchors
his suggestion on: (i) o selective

procedure

of gronting

debt

forgiveness for sovereigns whose
volue of liobilities exceed the

volue of their ossets;
Adjustments

to

(ii)

occounting

regulotions thot ollow creditors to

stretch copitol loss for debt
reduction through estoblished
processes

by on

occounting

stondords boord, rother thon by o

sovereign bonkruptcy low; (iii)
provision of debt relief subject to

politicol ond constitutionol

considerotions ossocioted with
stote bonkruptcy lows. costs ond

uncertointies linked with

prosecuting quosi-sovereigns ond
stillenoble stotes obtoin the much

liquidity during o debt
restructuring process.

By no meons is the obove on
exhoustive list of ovoiloble

resolution options. lt is of best on
overview ond does not suggest
the superiority of one option over
onother. The opproprioteness ond
combinotion of resolution options
requires on ossessment of cunent
conditions which differs ocross
economies.

7.0

complicotions. Observotory

onolysis hos shown in the cose of'
Nigerio, though there is o low risk of

o debt crisis, the continued

dependence on o mono-product
limits the revenue generoting
copocity ond of cunent finoncing
rotes of government domestic
bonowing increoses the possibility
of o short-run liquidity situotion. This

further colls
sustoinobility

to

question the

of fiscol policy in

Nigerio.

Consequently, there is need to
diversify the sources of revenue to
government os persistent negotive
shocks to oil levelcould undermine
recent ottempts of ensuring debt

sustoinobility. Fost-trocking
Conclusion

This orticle is on ottempt to
exomine the trigger foctors of o
liquidity or debt crisis. lt hos
through on x-roy of selected
economies shown thot these
feotures though voried ocross
countries, hove some common
undertone. llliquidity or insolvency
is often preceded by o build-up of
circumstonces with tortuous side
effects. At the minimum, the obility
to meet bosic socio-economic
demonds ore constroined. lt hos
shown thot resolution mechonisms

economic diversificotion with nonoilsector driving growth ond more
importontly contributing os o

of revenue, reolistic
budgetory ossumptions, greoter

source

focus on the non-oilfiscol bolonce
to isolote the effects of oil-reloted
revenues to the economy ore oll
meosures thot con redress the
issues. At the sub-notionol level,
government moy begin to redirect

their focus towords internolly

generoted revenue with greoter
ocus on pubiic ihvestment

f

monoQement.
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